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Quantum attacks on Bitcoin, and how to protect against them

Divesh Aggarwal, Gavin K. Brennen, Troy Lee, Miklos Santha, Marco Tomamichel

2017 · arXiv

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From the abstract

The key cryptographic protocols used to secure the internet and financial transactions of today are all susceptible to attack by the development of a sufficiently large quantum computer. One particular area at risk are cryptocurrencies, a market currently worth over 150 billion USD. We investigate the risk of Bitcoin, and other cryptocurrencies, to attacks by quantum computers. We find that the proof-of-work used by Bitcoin is relatively resistant to substantial speedup by quantum computers in the next 10 years, mainly because specialized ASIC miners are extremely fast compared to the estimated clock speed of near-term quantum computers. On the other hand, the elliptic curve signature scheme used by Bitcoin is much more at risk, and could be completely broken by a quantum computer as early as 2027, by the most optimistic estimates. We analyze an alternative proof-of-work called Momentum, based on finding collisions in a hash function, that is even more resistant to speedup by a quantum computer. We also review the available post-quantum signature schemes to see which one would best meet the security and efficiency requirements of blockchain applications.

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4 selected excerpts · 4 total mentions

ScottAaronson
Neutral mention · rule
See this recent survey article: https://arxiv.org/abs/1710.10377 Briefly, a fully fault-tolerant quantum computer could give a square-root speedup for Bitcoin's proof-of-work, and could completely break its elliptic-curve-based signature scheme. Both issues could in principle be fixed by migrating Bitcoin to quantumly harder problems, though in practice doing so could open up security holes of its own. This hasn't been done, but I think maybe there are other cryptocurrencies trying to use quantum-secure crypto from the outset? Googling just now, I found something called "Quantum Resistant Ledger" (https://theqrl.org/) -- does anyone here know more about what's out there? Let me stress that none of this is a concern with the QCs of the near future, which will have at most a few hundred decent qubits and no error correction, and which will not be able to threaten Bitcoin or any other cryptography.
westurner
Neutral mention · rule
This paper lists a few of the practical concerns for quantum-resistant algos (and proposes an algo that wasn't submitted to NIST Post-Quantum Cryptography Round 1): "Quantum attacks on Bitcoin, and how to protect against them" https://arxiv.org/abs/1710.10377 (~2027?) A few Quantum Computing and Quantum Algorithm resources: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=16052193 Responsive HTML (arxiv-vanity/engrafo, PLoS,) or Markdown in a Jupyter notebook (stored in a Git repo with a tag and maybe a DOI from figshare or Zenodo) really would be far more useful than comparing LaTeX equations rendered into PDFs.
westurner
Neutral mention · rule
There will be around 18M bitcoins in 2020. [1][2] [1] https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/Controlled_supply [2] https://bashco.github.io/ This paper [3] suggests we'll be needing to upgrade to quantum-secure hash functions instead of ECDSA before 2027. [3] "Quantum attacks on Bitcoin, and how to protect against them" https://arxiv.org/abs/1710.10377 Hopefully, Ethereum will have figured out a Proof of Stake [4] solution for distributed consensus which is as resistant to DDOS as Proof of Work; but with less energy consumption (thereby, unfortunately or fortunately, un-incentivizing clean energy as a primary business goal). [4] https://github.com/ethereum/wiki/wiki/Proof-of-Stake-FAQ

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