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Secure Encrypted Virtualization is Unsecure

Zhao-Hui Du, Zhiwei Ying, Zhenke Ma

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Yufei Mai, Phoebe Wang, Jesse Liu, Jesse Fang

2017 · arXiv

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From the abstract

Virtualization has become more important since cloud computing is getting more and more popular than before. There is an increasing demand for security among the cloud customers. AMD plans to provide Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) technology in its latest processor EPYC to protect virtual machines by encrypting its memory but without integrity protection. In this paper, we analyzed the weakness in the SEV design due to lack of integrity protection thus it is not so secure. Using different design flaw in physical address-based tweak algorithm to protect against ciphertext block move attacks, we found a realistic attack against SEV which could obtain the root privilege of an encrypted virtual machine protected by SEV. A demo to simulate the attack against a virtual machine protected by SEV is done in a Ryzen machine which supports Secure Memory Encryption (SME) technology since SEV enabled machine is still not available in market.

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rstuart4133
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We already have AMD's Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV). If you trust AMD, you can have a secure VM running on that CPU that's totally opaque to the person who owns the CPU. So even if the KGB could own the CPU, and the USA's president could use a VM on it in full confidence the KGB wouldn't know what calculations he's using it for. What's more it runs existing software, at full speed. Well, that's the theory anyway. In practice, researchers say modifying the encrypted memory, then running the program and seeing what happens next reveals something, enough to get them root in fact. [0] But even so, it's a deficiency that can be fixed, so if we aren't there yet we will…
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be one day. The difference between SEV and FHE is where with SEV you have to trust AMD, but with FHE you don't have to trust Intel. China could have designed and made this FHE chips, and you should be fine. But on the downside FHE is very, very slow (and this won't really close that gap), and expands the data hugely and of course doesn't run conventional software. To me it looks like that sorts of applications people are discussing here, such as database servers, will be done by SEV because of the shear amount data and processing they have to deal with. The article talks about speeding things up, but the primary bottle neck for those applications is MIPS/Watt. Speeding up FHE by throwing a huge GPU at it doesn't sole the MIPS/Watt problem. However, there are applications that tend to involve primary secrets - things like handling passwords, PIN's, PIN Pads, perhaps even gab.com's OAuth2 bearer tokens that involve tiny amounts of highly sensitive data. Perhaps FHE could be useful in dealing with them. [0] https://arxiv.org/pdf/1712.05090.pdf
ENOTTY
Neutral mention · rule
SEV has been subjected to its own share of attacks (and design/implementation fails), but note that it has a different threat model. * https://arxiv.org/pdf/1712.05090.pdf 2017 * https://arxiv.org/pdf/1612.01119.pdf 2017 * https://arxiv.org/pdf/1805.09604.pdf 2018 * https://ipads.se.sjtu.edu.cn/_media/publications/fidelius_hp... 2018 * https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2019/Jun/46 2019 * https://www3.cs.stonybrook.edu/~mikepo/papers/severest.asiac... 2019 * https://www.usenix.org/system/files/sec19-li-mengyuan_0.pdf 2019 * https://arxiv.org/pdf/1908.11680.pdf 2019 * https://arxiv.org/pdf/2004.11071.pdf 2020 Any enclave technology will be reliant on the underlying…
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security of the processor itself. Someone was going to have to go first. Intel happened to take greater risks in the name of performance, and all of their technologies (including their first-to-market enclave technology) are suffering reputational hits as a result. I'll also just mention that CrossTalk is the more interesting vulnerability affecting SGX that was disclosed today.

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