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There are no particles, there are only fields

Art Hobson

2012 · arXiv

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From the abstract

Quantum foundations are still unsettled, with mixed effects on science and society. By now it should be possible to obtain consensus on at least one issue: Are the fundamental constituents fields or particles? As this paper shows, experiment and theory imply unbounded fields, not bounded particles, are fundamental. This is especially clear for relativistic systems, implying it's also true of non-relativistic systems. Particles are epiphenomena arising from fields. Thus the Schroedinger field is a space-filling physical field whose value at any spatial point is the probability amplitude for an interaction to occur at that point. The field for an electron is the electron; each electron extends over both slits in the 2-slit experiment and spreads over the entire pattern; and quantum physics is about interactions of microscopic systems with the macroscopic world rather than just about measurements. It's important to clarify this issue because textbooks still teach a particles- and measurement-oriented interpretation that contributes to bewilderment among students and pseudoscience among the public. This article reviews classical and quantum fields, the 2-slit experiment, rigorous theorems showing particles are inconsistent with relativistic quantum theory, and several phenomena showing particles are incompatible with quantum field theories.

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9 selected excerpts · 9 total mentions

lisper
Recommendation · rule
Just about any modern book on QM interpretation will tell you this, though not in so many words. (They won't necessarily endorse this point of view, but they will tell you about it.) Here is my take on it: http://www.flownet.com/ron/QM.pdf (Or the movie version: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dEaecUuEqfc ) (These are now a wee bit dated, but still defensible.) For something written by an actual physicist I recommend anything by Tim Maudlin (he's a Bohmian, but his pedagogy is without peer) or David Z. Alberts, "Quantum Mechanics and Experience." UPDATE: There's also https://arxiv.org/abs/1204.4616
soveran
Neutral mention · rule
All the paradoxes disappear if we use Quantum Field Theory instead of Quantum Mechanics. I would really like someone with deep knowledge on Quantum Theory to explain if something is wrong with a theory that otherwise makes a lot of sense to me. A good read on the topic is the paper "There are no particles, there are only fields" — https://arxiv.org/pdf/1204.4616.pdf
antonvs
Neutral mention · rule
> if you're looking for the short list of simplest things, the number of types of fields there are is probably what you're looking for Definitely. It's rather strange that the OP article doesn't even mention the word "field". It seems that people in general have a hard time letting go of the idea of particles as fundamental. A good overview of this is "There are no particles, there are only fields" (https://arxiv.org/abs/1204.4616) by physics prof Art Hobson. Fields collapse the zoo described in the article significantly, because particles and antiparticles arise from the same field, and similarly, spin, polarization, and helicity are properties of the same field. Taking this into account, the 118 particles number that the article reaches at one point drops to 37 fields.
antonvs
Neutral mention · rule
Yes, but the issue is that they don't have identity. The idea of assigning unique identifiers to particles is doomed because, basically, "there are no particles, there are only fields" (https://arxiv.org/abs/1204.4616). Particles are how quantized fields present themselves when probed by localized interactions. In general, they're also observer-dependent. The idea of assigning an "ID" to an object reflects a macro-level notion of re-identifiable objects persisting through time. But at the quantum level, that kind of classical individuality - object identity - doesn't exist.
lisper
Neutral mention · rule
> We decide to have a theory about particles. I would say that's exactly where Bohm runs off the rails. The fact of the matter is that quantum systems are not particles. They are waves [1]. They can sometimes bunch up into very small spaces and behave to a very good approximation as if they were particles, but they aren't. If you insist that your theory talk about particles, then Bohm is a not-entirely-unreasonable place to end up. But that's kind of like saying that if you insist that your theory tell you how many angels can dance on the head of a pin that 42 is a not-entirely-unreasonable answer. Thanks for the references, those look interesting. P.S. The reference 4 link is broken. I'm guessing you meant https://arxiv.org/abs/0903.2211 --- [1] https://arxiv.org/abs/1204.4616
lisper
Neutral mention · rule
> Wasn't it a famous physicist who said "If you think you understand Quantum Mechanics then you don't understand Quantum Mechanics"? No. That's an apocryphal quote. Richard Feynman said in 1965, " I think I can safely say that nobody understands quantum mechanics." It turns out it wasn't true even when Feynman said it, and it's certainly not true today. Feynman's problem is that he was committed to the idea that particles are real. They aren't [1]. There are a lot of arguments over the proper interpretation of QM but it turns out that when you get to the bottom of things they are all saying the same things using different terminology. [1] https://aapt.scitation.org/doi/10.1119/1.4789885 (also https://arxiv.org/pdf/1204.4616.pdf)

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