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Is the quantum state real? An extended review of $ψ$-ontology theorems

M. S. Leifer

2014 · arXiv

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From the abstract

Towards the end of 2011, Pusey, Barrett and Rudolph derived a theorem that aimed to show that the quantum state must be ontic (a state of reality) in a broad class of realist approaches to quantum theory. This result attracted a lot of attention and controversy. The aim of this review article is to review the background to the Pusey--Barrett--Rudolph Theorem, to provide a clear presentation of the theorem itself, and to review related work that has appeared since the publication of the Pusey--Barrett--Rudolph paper. In particular, this review: Explains what it means for the quantum state to be ontic or epistemic (a state of knowledge); Reviews arguments for and against an ontic interpretation of the quantum state as they existed prior to the Pusey--Barrett--Rudolph Theorem; Explains why proving the reality of the quantum state is a very strong constraint on realist theories in that it would imply many of the known no-go theorems, such as Bell's Theorem and the need for an exponentially large ontic state space; Provides a comprehensive presentation of the Pusey--Barrett--Rudolph Theorem itself, along with subsequent improvements and criticisms of its assumptions; Reviews two other arguments for the reality of the quantum state: the first due to Hardy and the second due to Colbeck and Renner, and explains why their assumptions are less compelling than those of the Pusey--Barrett--Rudolph Theorem; Reviews subsequent work aimed at ruling out stronger notions of what it means for the quantum state to be epistemic and points out open questions in this area. The overall aim is not only to provide the background needed for the novice in this area to understand the current status, but also to discuss often overlooked subtleties that should be of interest to the experts.

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hackandthink
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"It doesn't matter whether quantum uncertainty is ontological or epistemological" It matters for a lot of people, they want to know und understand. And maybe somebody comes up with an experiment. "What Bell’s Theorem really shows us is that the foundations of quantum theory is a bona fide field of physics, in which questions are to be resolved by rigor- ous argument and experiment, rather than remaining the subject of open-ended debate. In other words, it is a mistake to crudely divide quantum theory into its practical part and its interpretation, and to think of the latter as metaphysics, experimental or otherwise." Matt Leifer: "Is the Quantum State Real?..." https://arxiv.org/pdf/1409.1570.pdf
n4r9
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Ah, I think I have a clearer understanding of what you're getting at now. I think your first objection is to the idea that nothing physical is actually happening during the collapse of the wave function. On this I completely agree and I apologise for having used very poor phrasing. When I said "merely a reflection" I didn't intend to mean that nothing physical is occurring. I meant that (according to QBism) there is not a real objective quantum system whose real objective quantum state irreversibly collapses into a single real objective pure state. Rather, an agent has a physical interaction (a "kick") with the real world, which incurs a particular outcome, after which…
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the agent updates their beliefs about the outcomes of future interactions in a manner analogous to Bayesian updating. The fact that this update process happens to be conveniently described by a mathematical operation we call "collapse" is neither here nor there to a QBist. I think your second objection is something like this: some beliefs are better than others. In many situations there appears to be one belief which is "the best". Therefore whichever belief is "the best" is essentially an objective description of the world. Therefore the quantum state of a system is real and objective. Is that a fair assessment? Whether or not this objection holds water, I must retain the claim that in QBism the wave function is not "really objectively out there". It is clear that in QBism a quantum state represents an agent's beliefs (or in weaker interpretations, an agent's information) regarding a system, not something objective about the system. Fuchs, Schack, Caves and others have said this again and again. For example: > Contrary to those desires, quantum theory does not describe physical reality. What it does is provide an algorithm for computing probabilities for the macroscopic events (“detector clicks”) that are the consequences of our experimental interventions. http://www.phy.pku.edu.cn/~qhcao/resources/class/QM/PTO00007... > In other words, Fuchs argued, the wave function does not describe the world—it describes the observer. “Quantum mechanics,” he says, “is a law of thought.” Quantum Bayesianism, or QBism as Fuchs now calls it, solves many of quantum theory’s deepest mysteries. Take, for instance, the infamous “collapse of the wave function,” wherein the quantum system inexplicably transitions from multiple simultaneous states to a single actuality. According to QBism, the wave function’s “collapse” is simply the observer updating his or her beliefs after making a measurement. https://www.wired.com/2015/06/private-view-quantum-reality/ > QUANTUM STATES DO NOT EXIST > The world may be full of stuff and things of all kinds, but among all the stuff and all the things, there is no unique, observer-independent, quantum-state kind of stuff > Specifically, there can be no such thing as a right and true quantum state, if such is thought of as defined by criteria external to the agent making the assignment: Quantum states must instead be like personalist, Bayesian probabilities https://arxiv.org/pdf/1003.5209.pdf BTW, have you heard of the PBR theorem? It made me do a lot of thinking about what it could possibly mean for the quantum state to be a physical fact vs simply information about an underlying state. If these sorts of ideas are interesting to you, you might enjoy a write-up of the theorem by Matt Leifer: https://arxiv.org/pdf/1409.1570.pdf
abdullahkhalids
Neutral mention · rule
First, the dominant philosophy of physics/science is that of falsification. Which roughly says that it is impossible to know the "true" laws. All of physics is just models, nothing else, and you can't do better than that. Second, physicists also do not foist this question onto philosophers. There is plenty of work done on this by physicists. Particularly, on the question of whether the wavefunction is simply a calculational tool or more, there are many many papers written by physicists. Two samples [1, 2]. [1] https://www.nature.com/articles/nphys3233 [2] https://arxiv.org/abs/1409.1570

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