Was there a follow up to this paper? NO Need to Worry about Adversarial Examples in Object Detection in Autonomous Vehicles https://arxiv.org/abs/1707.03501
NO Need to Worry about Adversarial Examples in Object Detection in Autonomous Vehicles
Jiajun Lu, Hussein Sibai, Evan Fabry, David Forsyth
2017 · arXiv
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From the abstract
It has been shown that most machine learning algorithms are susceptible to adversarial perturbations. Slightly perturbing an image in a carefully chosen direction in the image space may cause a trained neural network model to misclassify it. Recently, it was shown that physical adversarial examples exist: printing perturbed images then taking pictures of them would still result in misclassification. This raises security and safety concerns. However, these experiments ignore a crucial property of physical objects: the camera can view objects from different distances and at different angles. In this paper, we show experiments that suggest that current constructions of physical adversarial examples do not disrupt object detection from a moving platform. Instead, a trained neural network classifies most of the pictures taken from different distances and angles of a perturbed image correctly. We believe this is because the adversarial property of the perturbation is sensitive to the scale at which the perturbed picture is viewed, so (for example) an autonomous car will misclassify a stop sign only from a small range of distances. Our work raises an important question: can one construct examples that are adversarial for many or most viewing conditions? If so, the construction should offer very significant insights into the internal representation of patterns by deep networks. If not, there is a good prospect that adversarial examples can be reduced to a curiosity with little practical impact.
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There was a paper that claimed those sorts of rotations and movements can help alleviate adversarial examples: https://arxiv.org/abs/1707.03501 However, OpenAI quickly refuted it by creating adversarial examples that continue to fool the classifier even when rotated, scaled, etc: https://blog.openai.com/robust-adversarial-inputs/ So it looks like there's no "easy" way out here. Multiple types of sensors may help, but it seems likely that it will still be possible to construct examples that fool network over all sensor inputs at once. Ian Goodfellow and Nicolas Papernot have a good blog on machine learning security issues. One relevant post on why this is such a hard problem: http://www.cleverhans.io/security/privacy/ml/2017/02/15/why-...
This paper is a fairly convincing counter-argument to another recent work (https://arxiv.org/abs/1707.03501) on physical adversarial examples for autonomous vehicles. The other paper argued there was "no need to worry" about such physical attacks.
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