It is quite likely that the intermediate tokens don’t have ‘semantic import’[0] There are methods like Habitual Reasoning Distillation or Inverted Reasoning Traces [1] that can help. While there are reasons to hide the intermediate tokens from a IP protection stand point, there is also a need to hide more effective and efficient generating that doesn’t fit the R1 claims of an aha moment that has been debunked, but is a consumer expectation. While hidden intermediate tokens do increase the difficulty, it is not a from barrier in itself, especially as they are billed, given information about their length. [0] https://arxiv.org/abs/2504.09762v4 [1] https://arxiv.org/abs/2603.07267
Position: Stop Anthropomorphizing Intermediate Tokens as Reasoning/Thinking Traces!
Subbarao Kambhampati, Karthik Valmeekam, Siddhant Bhambri
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Vardhan Palod, Lucas Saldyt, Kaya Stechly, Soumya Rani Samineni, Durgesh Kalwar, Upasana Biswas
2025 · arXiv
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From the abstract
Intermediate token generation (ITG), where a model produces output before the solution, has become a standard method to improve the performance of language models on reasoning tasks. These intermediate tokens have been called \say{reasoning traces} or even \say{thinking traces} -- implicitly anthropomorphizing the traces, and implying that these traces resemble steps a human might take when solving a challenging problem, and as such can provide an interpretable window into the operation of the model's thinking process to the end user. In this position paper, we present evidence that this anthropomorphization isn't a harmless metaphor, and instead is quite dangerous -- it confuses the nature of these models and how to use them effectively, and leads to questionable research. We call on the community to avoid such anthropomorphization of intermediate tokens.
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Related: Stop Anthropomorphizing Intermediate Tokens as Reasoning/Thinking Traces![1] > Our findings consistently challenge the prevailing narrative that intermediate tokens constitute a semantically meaningful reasoning process. First, we observe a pronounced lack of correlation between solution correctness and trace validity—models frequently produce invalid reasoning traces even when they arrive at correct solutions. Second, and more strikingly, models trained on corrupted or semantically irrelevant traces achieve performance comparable to, and often exceeding, that of models trained on correct traces, especially on out-of-distribution tasks. [1]: https://arxiv.org/abs/2504.09762
The discussion has become contentious and that's very unfortunate because there's clearly some confusion about Prolog and that's always a great opportunity to learn. You say: >> Yes, though, it traverses the code tree by depth first walk. Here's what I suggest: try to think what, exactly, is the data structure searched by Depth First Search during Prolog's execution. You'll find that this structure is what we call and SLD-Tree. That's a tree where the root is a Horn goal that begins the proof (i.e. the thing we want to dis-prove, since we're doing a proof by refutation); every other node is a new goal derived during the proof; every branch is a Resolution step between one…
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goal and one definite program clause from a Prolog program; and every leaf of a finite branch is either the empty clause, signalling the success of the proof by refutation, or a non-empty goal that can not be further reduced, which signals the failure of the proof. So that's basically a proof tree and the search is ... a proof. So Prolog is not just searching a list to find an element, say. It's searching a proof tree to find a proof. It just so happens that searching a proof tree to find a proof corresponds to the execution of a program. But while you can use a search to carry out a proof, not every search is a proof. You have to get your ducks in a row the right way around otherwise, yeah, all you have is a search. This is not magick, it's just ... computer science. It should go without saying that you can do the same thing with Python, or with javascript, or with any other Turing-complete language, but then you'd basically have to re-invent Prolog, and implement it in that other language; an ad-hoc, informally specified, bug-ridden and slow implementation of half of Prolog, most like. This is all without examining whether you can fix LLMs' lack of reasoning by funneling their output through a Prolog interpreter. I personally don't think that's a great idea. Let's see, what was that soundbite... "intelligence is shifting the test part of generate-test into the generate part" [1]. That's clearly not what pushing LLM output into a Prolog interpreter achieves. Clearly, if good, old-fashioned symbolic AI has to be combined with statistical language modelling, that has to happen much earlier in the statistical language modelling process. Not when it's already done and dusted and we have a language model; which is only statistical. Like putting the bubbles in the soda before you serve the drink, not after, the logic has to go into the language modelling before the modelling is done, not after. Otherwise there's no way I can see that the logic can control the modelling. Then all you have is generate-and-test, and it's meh as usual. Although note that much recent work on carrying out mathematical proofs with LLMs does exactly that, e.g. like DeepMind's AlphaProof. Generate-and-test works, it's just dumb and inefficient and you can only really make it work if you have the same resources as DeepMind and equivalent. _____________ [1] Marvin Minsky via Rao Kampampathi and students: https://arxiv.org/html/2504.09762v1
I'm almost positive reasoning is not an emergent behavior considering the reasoning models have specific architecture. As a source: https://arxiv.org/html/2504.09762v1
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