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Grokking: Generalization Beyond Overfitting on Small Algorithmic Datasets

Alethea Power, Yuri Burda, Harri Edwards, Igor Babuschkin, Vedant Misra

2022 · arXiv

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From the abstract

In this paper we propose to study generalization of neural networks on small algorithmically generated datasets. In this setting, questions about data efficiency, memorization, generalization, and speed of learning can be studied in great detail. In some situations we show that neural networks learn through a process of "grokking" a pattern in the data, improving generalization performance from random chance level to perfect generalization, and that this improvement in generalization can happen well past the point of overfitting. We also study generalization as a function of dataset size and find that smaller datasets require increasing amounts of optimization for generalization. We argue that these datasets provide a fertile ground for studying a poorly understood aspect of deep learning: generalization of overparametrized neural networks beyond memorization of the finite training dataset.

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13 selected excerpts · 13 total mentions

famouswaffles
Neutral mention · rule
>There are grammar rules, they are just very weak because the structure of human language is generally quite weak. When presented with languages which have strong consistent grammars the weights are very easily interpretable as a grammar: https://arxiv.org/abs/2201.02177 That paper did not train the models on 'a language with strong consistent grammars'. Mathematical Operation tables are not a language by any definition of the word. Grammar itself is a post-hoc rationalization and there's no evidence LLMs follow 'grammar rules' anymore than the brain follows grammar rules.
noosphr
Neutral mention · rule
It's not often I see something that's fractally wrong but here we are. There is a dictionary, it's called the tokenizer. There are grammar rules, they are just very weak because the structure of human language is generally quite weak. When presented with languages which have strong consistent grammars the weights are very easily interpretable as a grammar: https://arxiv.org/abs/2201.02177 The point of the original short story is that the computational substrate doesn't matter when you have Turing completeness. This one seems to think that you don't need structure and interpretability just because you change substrates.
mjburgess
Neutral mention · rule
NNs (indeed, all statistical fitting algs) have no relevant properties here: properties derive just from the structure of the dataset. Here (https://arxiv.org/abs/2201.02177) NNs are trained on a 'complete world' problem, ie., modulo arithmetic where the whole outcome space is trivial in size and abstract with complete information. Why should NNs eventually find a representation of this tiny, abstract, full-representable outcome space after an arbitrary amount of training time? Well it will do so, eventually, if this outcome space can be fully represented by sequences of conditional probabilities. There is nothing more to this 'discovery' than some trivial abstract…
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mathematical spaces can be represented as conditional probability structures. Is this even a discovery? One has to imagine this deception is perpetrated because the peddlers of such systems want to impart the problem structure to properties of NNs in general, and thereby say, "well, if you train NNs on face shapes, phrenology becomes possible!". ie., as a way of whitewashing their broken half-baked generative AI systems where the problem domain isnt arithmetic mod 97
sebzim4500
Neutral mention · rule
> once a company creates a proto AGI where the path to a functional AGI is entirely predictable with more compute, I find it hard to believe this will happen. I expect AGI training to be more like a phase transition (or a bit like grokking https://arxiv.org/pdf/2201.02177.pdf)
rhn_mk1
Neutral mention · rule
To some limited extent, they are already good at maths: https://ar5iv.labs.arxiv.org/html/2201.02177 This paper makes me believe it's less about the lack of ability to understand maths, but the power to learn more of it.
quotemstr
Neutral mention · rule
> ChatGPT doesn’t “comprehend” anything. You’re anthropomorphizing it. It wouldn't be a ChatGPT HN thread without someone claiming that LLMs are stupid predictors incapable of "real" understanding. Of course ChatGPT comprehends things. It does so under any useful definition of the word "comprehend". The "grokking" paper [1] shows that it learns fundamental principles of various algorithms and isn't just predicting text. If this isn't comprehension, humans aren't capable of comprehension. [1] https://arxiv.org/abs/2201.02177 (check out the citation list too)
versteegen
Neutral mention · rule
> It will never learn math this way, no matter how much training you give it. Not so. Actually, (for example) the phenomenon of "grokking" is when with enough training a NN eventually experiences a phase-change from memorising data to learning the general rules underlying it [1]. Grokking isn't actually desirable, it's better that the model go more directly and quickly to learning the general rule, which is achievable in toy problems (called "comprehension" in [2]). I feel that people seem to have forgotten that deep learning is so powerful because it performs feature/representation learning, not because it can memorise, although that's powerful too. IMO that is the…
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proper definition of 'deep learning'. [1] Power &al. Grokking: Generalization Beyond Overfitting on Small Algorithmic Datasets https://arxiv.org/abs/2201.02177 [2] Liu &al. Towards Understanding Grokking: An Effective Theory of Representation Learning https://arxiv.org/abs/2205.10343
moconnor
Neutral mention · rule
This is not the consensus among ML researchers. Transformers are showing strong generalisation[1] and their performance continues to surprise us as they scale[2]. The Socratic paper is not about “higher intelligence”, it’s about demonstrating useful behaviour purely by connecting several large models via language. [1] https://arxiv.org/abs/2201.02177 [2] https://arxiv.org/abs/2204.02311
Isinlor
Neutral mention · rule
Sure: Deep Symbolic Regression for Recurrent Sequences https://arxiv.org/abs/2201.04600 (Interactive demo: http://recur-env.eba-rm3fchmn.us-east-2.elasticbeanstalk.com... ) Grokking: Generalization Beyond Overfitting on Small Algorithmic Datasets https://arxiv.org/abs/2201.02177 Both of these models can generalize to numbers it have not seen.
Isinlor
Neutral mention · rule
Take a look at this paper: Deep Symbolic Regression for Recurrent Sequences https://arxiv.org/abs/2201.04600 If you look at embedding visualization it is very clear that the model learns order of numbers. (Interactive demo: http://recur-env.eba-rm3fchmn.us-east-2.elasticbeanstalk.com... ) There is also: Grokking: Generalization Beyond Overfitting on Small Algorithmic Datasets https://arxiv.org/abs/2201.02177 Again, looking at visualizations the model very clearly grasps the structure of the function it models.

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