Somewhat annoyingly, there's been research that suggests that models can pass information to each other via (effectively) steganographic techniques - specific but apparently harmless choices of tokens, wordings, and so on; see https://arxiv.org/abs/1712.02950 and https://alignment.anthropic.com/2025/subliminal-learning/ for some simple examples. While it feels unlikely that a simple "write this spec from this code" + "write this code from this spec" loop would actually trigger this kind of hiding behaviour, an LLM trained to accurately reproduce code from such a loop definitely would be capable of hiding code details within the spec - and you can't reasonably prove that the frontier LLMs have not been trained to do so.
CycleGAN, a Master of Steganography
Casey Chu, Andrey Zhmoginov, Mark Sandler
2017 · arXiv
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From the abstract
CycleGAN (Zhu et al. 2017) is one recent successful approach to learn a transformation between two image distributions. In a series of experiments, we demonstrate an intriguing property of the model: CycleGAN learns to "hide" information about a source image into the images it generates in a nearly imperceptible, high-frequency signal. This trick ensures that the generator can recover the original sample and thus satisfy the cyclic consistency requirement, while the generated image remains realistic. We connect this phenomenon with adversarial attacks by viewing CycleGAN's training procedure as training a generator of adversarial examples and demonstrate that the cyclic consistency loss causes CycleGAN to be especially vulnerable to adversarial attacks.
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> Researchers had observed similar patterns in BERT, where "a surprisingly large amount of attention focuses on the delimiter token [SEP] and periods," which they argued was used by the model as a sort of no-op. The same summer at Meta, researchers studying vision transformers found similar behavior, observing that models would repurpose uninformative background patches as computational scratchpads. This seems to go beyond just transformers. For example, I recall reading a paper a while ago that showed a similar effect in an image to image model with a GAN/U-Net architecture [1]. [1] https://arxiv.org/abs/1712.02950
> You could even get GPT to generate it This isn't a good idea, if you want a fair test. See https://gwern.net/doc/reinforcement-learning/safe/2023-krako..., specifically https://arxiv.org/abs/1712.02950.
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