Dolphin Attack used ultrasonic amplitude modulation against a variety of devices with some success [0]. Page 9 for the results table. I believe they were taking advantage of the non linearity of microphones. 0: https://arxiv.org/pdf/1708.09537.pdf
DolphinAtack: Inaudible Voice Commands
Guoming Zhang, Chen Yan, Xiaoyu Ji
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Taimin Zhang, Tianchen Zhang, Wenyuan Xu
2017 · arXiv
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From the abstract
Speech recognition (SR) systems such as Siri or Google Now have become an increasingly popular human-computer interaction method, and have turned various systems into voice controllable systems(VCS). Prior work on attacking VCS shows that the hidden voice commands that are incomprehensible to people can control the systems. Hidden voice commands, though hidden, are nonetheless audible. In this work, we design a completely inaudible attack, DolphinAttack, that modulates voice commands on ultrasonic carriers (e.g., f > 20 kHz) to achieve inaudibility. By leveraging the nonlinearity of the microphone circuits, the modulated low frequency audio commands can be successfully demodulated, recovered, and more importantly interpreted by the speech recognition systems. We validate DolphinAttack on popular speech recognition systems, including Siri, Google Now, Samsung S Voice, Huawei HiVoice, Cortana and Alexa. By injecting a sequence of inaudible voice commands, we show a few proof-of-concept attacks, which include activating Siri to initiate a FaceTime call on iPhone, activating Google Now to switch the phone to the airplane mode, and even manipulating the navigation system in an Audi automobile. We propose hardware and software defense solutions. We validate that it is feasible to detect DolphinAttack by classifying the audios using supported vector machine (SVM), and suggest to re-design voice controllable systems to be resilient to inaudible voice command attacks.
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Completely agree. I use multiple ad- and tracker-blocking browser extensions, but mostly due to the tracking. Incidentally, while blocking ads online can be noticed by the serving party (to e.g. display an annoying warning) those behind the goods/services being verbally advertised are none the wiser. > There are ways to overlay inaudible tones Are you referencing prior work or was that hypothetical? There is actual prior work on this. They were able to engineer a POC that could trigger "Hey Siri" and "OK Google" inaudibly by broadcasting it with ultrasound on a harmonic of the correct frequency, but at a pitch inaudible to humans [1] [1] https://arxiv.org/pdf/1708.09537.pdf
That's clever but that's so many dB down with any sane anti-aliasing filter that it would require quite the sound source. Based on flipping through the pages of the paper (https://arxiv.org/pdf/1708.09537.pdf), it looks like they're taking advantage of the non-linearity in the response at high frequencies to effectively demodulate a lower-frequency signal that was mixed up to ~22 KHz. Which, if that's what they're doing, is totally awesome!
In case anyone missed it, the commands don't have to be audible: From https://arxiv.org/pdf/1708.09537.pdf > DolphinAttack ... modulates voice commands on ultrasonic carriers ... to achieve inaudibility. By leveraging the nonlinearity of the microphone circuits the modulated ... commands can be successfully demodulated
Filter won’t necessarily help. It’s possible to use ultra sonic for amplitude modulation signal to affect the non linearity of a microphone itself. [0] Although it does require knowing what the underlying natural sound to be modulated is (some processing required). Robustness to background noise doesn’t necessarily help either. 0: https://arxiv.org/pdf/1708.09537.pdf
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