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The Peter Principle Revisited: A Computational Study

Alessandro Pluchino, Andrea Rapisarda, Cesare Garofalo

2009 · arXiv

PsychologyEconomics
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From the abstract

In the late sixties the Canadian psychologist Laurence J. Peter advanced an apparently paradoxical principle, named since then after him, which can be summarized as follows: {\it 'Every new member in a hierarchical organization climbs the hierarchy until he/she reaches his/her level of maximum incompetence'}. Despite its apparent unreasonableness, such a principle would realistically act in any organization where the mechanism of promotion rewards the best members and where the mechanism at their new level in the hierarchical structure does not depend on the competence they had at the previous level, usually because the tasks of the levels are very different to each other. Here we show, by means of agent based simulations, that if the latter two features actually hold in a given model of an organization with a hierarchical structure, then not only is the Peter principle unavoidable, but also it yields in turn a significant reduction of the global efficiency of the organization. Within a game theory-like approach, we explore different promotion strategies and we find, counterintuitively, that in order to avoid such an effect the best ways for improving the efficiency of a given organization are either to promote each time an agent at random or to promote randomly the best and the worst members in terms of competence.

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5 selected excerpts · 5 total mentions

plint
Neutral mention · rule
There's some game theoryish ideas such as the Peter Principle which might explain why meritocratic promotion may not work out in the long run for organizations. See: https://arxiv.org/abs/0907.0455 which won the parody Ig Nobel prize, but I don't really understand why, as I thought it was at least as interesting as Robert Axelrod's simulation of successful strategies in the iterated prisoner's dilemma. In fact, I think it would be even warranted to do an extension of this model, considering possible assumptions such as Dilbert principle, negative selection, and alignment of agents with different goals and basic strategies. I am not understanding why such a model would be considered silly instead of insightful.
Original comment Steve Jobs Said the Best Managers Never Want to Be Managers
GuB-42
Neutral mention · rule
Also worth noting that a promotion is not just a raise, it is also a change of job. See Peter Principle. There is even a igNobel winning publication suggesting that it might be more efficient to promote people at random... https://arxiv.org/abs/0907.0455
Original comment Hotbed of Misinformation

Keep following the thread.

More in Psychology

More from the same topics.

2018arXiv

Talent vs Luck: the role of randomness in success and failure

A. Pluchino. A. E. Biondo, A. Rapisarda

The largely dominant meritocratic paradigm of highly competitive Western cultures is rooted on the belief that success is due mainly, if not exclusively, to personal qualities such as talent, intelligence, skills, efforts or risk taking.

Psychology
16 mentions14 months
2.5HN score