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The Platonic Representation Hypothesis

Minyoung Huh, Brian Cheung, Tongzhou Wang, Phillip Isola

2024 · arXiv

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From the abstract

We argue that representations in AI models, particularly deep networks, are converging. First, we survey many examples of convergence in the literature: over time and across multiple domains, the ways by which different neural networks represent data are becoming more aligned. Next, we demonstrate convergence across data modalities: as vision models and language models get larger, they measure distance between datapoints in a more and more alike way. We hypothesize that this convergence is driving toward a shared statistical model of reality, akin to Plato's concept of an ideal reality. We term such a representation the platonic representation and discuss several possible selective pressures toward it. Finally, we discuss the implications of these trends, their limitations, and counterexamples to our analysis.

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17 selected excerpts · 17 total mentions

ainch
Neutral mention · rule
Thank you for expanding! I come from more of an ML background so still learning a lot on these topics: Agreed that the neocortex uses fewer layers because of looping - I also suspect it's partly because neurons are more complex than the neurons used in ANNs, so in principle they should be capable of more sophisticated computation in a single forward pass (especially considering that handling multiple neurotransmitters could mean superposed functions). The point about there being one correct way to model something does seem backed up by the Platonic Representation hypothesis (https://arxiv.org/pdf/2405.07987). I've even seem some work that shows you can find a bijective…
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map between the latent spaces of different transformers (https://arxiv.org/pdf/2505.12540). Your point about Finsler spaces is fascinating - I hadn't come across the term before. It'd be interesting to see if there's work that specifically allows latents to exhibit that kind of directional metric behaviour, and whether that improves generalisation or something. On the entire brain being dedicated to prediction, that's more of a high-level comment. I was thinking of work like Andy Clark on predictive processing, which suggests that even regions of the brain which we think of as receptive (eg. the visual cortex) may be implementing a generative/predictive model which is corrected by sensory input.
krackers
Neutral mention · rule
Platonic representation hypothesis? https://arxiv.org/abs/2405.07987 Maybe in the same way fourier/wavelet basis is just the most natural way to work with certain signals or images, there's a certain representation for language and a representation for "thinking" that's natural. Maths could itself be said to be an abstract representation of the latter, and even if the idea of a "universal grammar" is dead, maybe there's still some natural space to work with all human languages owing to the shared biological priors we have as humans.
jpcompartir
Neutral mention · rule
Fair push back, but I do think the LSTM vs Transformers point kinda supports my position in the limit, not refutes. Once the compute bottleneck is removed, LSTMs scale favourably. https://arxiv.org/pdf/2510.02228 (I believe there's similar work done on vanilla LSTMs, but I'd have to go digging) So the bottleneck was compute. Which is compatible with 'data or compute'. But to accept your point, at the time the algorothmic advances were useful/did unlock/remove the bottleneck. A wider point is that eventually (once compute and data are scaled enough) the algorithms are all learning the same representations: https://arxiv.org/pdf/2405.07987 And of course the canon: https://nonint.com/2023/06/10/the-it-in-ai-models-is-the-dat... http://www.incompleteideas.net/IncIdeas/BitterLesson.html Scaling compute & data > algorithmic cleverness
observationist
Neutral mention · rule
https://arxiv.org/abs/2505.12540 https://arxiv.org/abs/2405.07987 These, other papers, and the lottery ticket phenomenon; what it boils down to is that any neural network like system which encodes some common mapping of a phenomenon in the context of the world - not necessarily a world model, but some "real-world thing" - will tend to map to a limited number of permutations of some archetypal representation, which will resemble other mappings of the same thing. The lottery ticket phenomenon is a bit like the birthday paradox; there will be some number of structures in a large, random initialization of neural network weights that coincide with one or more archetypal mappings of complex objects. Some sub-networks are also useful mappings to features of one or more complex objects, which makes learning hierarchical nested networks of feature mappings easier; it's also why interpretability is so damned difficult.
in-silico
Neutral mention · rule
> They're going to diverge if the underlying manner in which data gets memorized and encoded, such as with RNNs, like RWKV. In the original paper (https://arxiv.org/abs/2405.07987) the authors also compared the representations of transformer-based LLMs to convolution-based image models. They found just as much alignment between them as when both models were transformers.
agentcoops
Neutral mention · rule
Apologies if this comes across as too abstract, but I think your comment raises really important questions. (1) While studying the properties of the mathematical objects produced is important, I don't think we should understand the situation you describe as a problem to be solved. In old supervised machine learning methods, human beings were tasked with defining the rather crude 'features' of relevance in a data/object domain, so each dimension had some intuitive significance (often binary 'is tall', 'is blue' etc). The question now is really about learning the objective geometry of meaning, so the dimensions of the resultant vector don't exactly have to be 'meaningful'…
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in the same way -- and, counter-intuitive as it may seem, this is progress. Now the question is of the necessary dimensionality of the mathematical space in which semantic relations can be preserved -- and meaning /is/ in some fundamental sense the resultant geometry. (2) This is where the 'Platonic hypothesis' research [1] is so fascinating: empirically we have found that the learned structures from text and image converge. This isn't saying we don't need images and sensor robots, but it appears we get the best results when training across modalities (language and image, for example). This is really fascinating for how we understand language. While any particular text might get things wrong, the language that human beings have developed over however many thousands of years really does seem to do a good job of breaking out the relevant possible 'features' of experience. The convergence of models trained from language and image suggests a certain convergence between what is learnable from sensory experience of the world and the relations that human beings have slowly come to know through the relations between words. [1] https://phillipi.github.io/prh/ and https://arxiv.org/pdf/2405.07987
UltraSane
Neutral mention · rule
This is called the The Platonic Representation Hypothesis https://arxiv.org/abs/2405.07987 We argue that representations in AI models, particularly deep networks, are converging. First, we survey many examples of convergence in the literature: over time and across multiple domains, the ways by which different neural networks represent data are becoming more aligned. Next, we demonstrate convergence across data modalities: as vision models and language models get larger, they measure distance between datapoints in a more and more alike way. We hypothesize that this convergence is driving toward a shared statistical model of reality, akin to Plato's concept of an ideal reality. We term such a representation the platonic representation and discuss several possible selective pressures toward it. Finally, we discuss the implications of these trends, their limitations, and counterexamples to our analysis.
jxmorris12
Neutral mention · rule
Very fair! > Does this extend to being able to analytically determine which concepts are encodable in one embedding but not another? An embedding from a deft tiny stories LLM presumably cannot encode concepts about RNA replication. Yeah, this is a great point. We're mostly building off of this prior work on the Platonic Representation Hypothesis (https://arxiv.org/abs/2405.07987). I think our findings go-so-far as to apply to large-enough models that are well-enough trained on The Internet. So, text and images. Maybe audio, too, if the audio is scraped from the Internet. So I don't think your tinystories example qualifies for the PRH, since it's not enough data and it's…
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not representative of the whole Internet. And RNA data is (I would guess) something very different altogether. > Assuming that is true. If you can detect when you are trying to put a square peg into a round hole, does this mean you have the ability to remove square holes from a system? Not sure I follow this part.
sam_ezeh
Neutral mention · rule
>I am not a neuroscientist, but I think it's likely that LLMs (with 10s of billions of parameters) and the human brain (with 1-2 orders of magnitude more neural connections[1]) process language in analogous ways Related is the platonic representation hypothesis where models apparently converge to similar representations of relationships between data points. https://phillipi.github.io/prh/ https://arxiv.org/abs/2405.07987
thomashop
Neutral mention · rule
We argue that representations in AI models, particularly deep networks, are converging. First, we survey many examples of convergence in the literature: over time and across multiple domains, the ways by which different neural networks represent data are becoming more aligned. Next, we demonstrate convergence across data modalities: as vision models and language models get larger, they measure distance between datapoints in a more and more alike way. We hypothesize that this convergence is driving toward a shared statistical model of reality, akin to Plato’s concept of an ideal reality. We term such a representation the platonic representation and discuss several possible selective pressures toward it. Finally, we discuss the implications of these trends, their limitations, and counterexamples to our analysis. https://arxiv.org/html/2405.07987v5
TastyDucks
Neutral mention · rule
The use of this sort of anthropomorphic and "incantation" style prompting is a workaround while mechanistic interpretability and monosemanticity work[1] is done to expose the neuron(s) that have larger impacts on model behavior -- cf Golden Gate Claude. Further, even if end-users only have access to token input to steer model behavior, we likely have the ability to reverse engineer optimal inputs to drive desired behaviors; convergent internal representations[2] means this research might transfer across models as well (particularly, Gemma -> Gemini, as I believe they share the same architecture and training data). I suspect we'll see understandable super-human prompting (and higher-level control) emerge from GAN and interpretability work within the next few years. [1]: https://transformer-circuits.pub/2024/scaling-monosemanticit... [2]: https://arxiv.org/abs/2405.07987
observationist
Neutral mention · rule
>> I would argue this is deeply false I am making the case that this is distinctly and specifically true, for these types of models. They're eliciting many of the underlying functions and processes that brought about the data; transformers are able to model the higher degrees of abstraction that previous neural architectures could not. This was one of the major features of transformers that make them so powerful. It's comparable to the idea that if you trained a model to output human sounding speech, many of the functions that shape the voice will correspond to the physical attributes that affect the sound of actual human voices. Volume of the mouth, shape of the lips,…
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position of teeth, what the tongue does, etc - some of those things will be captured, others will be mashed into "good enough" , and others will be captured as an optimization possible in silicon but not for flesh and blood. It's not a one to one correspondence, but capturing process semantics and abstractions is why we have ChatGPT with transformers and not CNNs (although RNNs could have pulled it off back in the 90s, see: RWKV) Anyway - the training methods, the paradigm of next token generation (in contrast to things like diffusion) and other aspects of LLMs restrict them to a subset of human capabilities, but it's reasonable to make the claim that many of the same functions that operate in Werncke's area and Broca's area in the human brain are resident in transformers. Many of the same associations between language and emotion and those abstract correlations - unspecified, implicit context that exists in the training data, but only as a deep subtext, sometimes even distributed across many texts, like cultural trends and so forth - are modeled by LLMs, not as an explicit feature of the data, but an implicit feature or function of the processes which produced the data. Plus, there seems to be some support for the idea that for intelligent systems, modeling the world will result in comparable structures, networks, and features for similar concepts and knowledge - because you're modeling consistent, persistent things using modalities that are shared, or overlap, the way in which things are modeled converges on "universal" forms, simply due to constraints of utility and efficiency. https://arxiv.org/abs/2405.07987
thomashop
Neutral mention · rule
In fact, it looks like the model is doing those things internally. We argue that representations in AI models, particularly deep networks, are converging. First, we survey many examples of convergence in the literature: over time and across multiple domains, the ways by which different neural networks represent data are becoming more aligned. Next, we demonstrate convergence across data modalities: as vision models and language models get larger, they measure distance between datapoints in a more and more alike way. We hypothesize that this convergence is driving toward a shared statistical model of reality, akin to Plato’s concept of an ideal reality. We term such a representation the platonic representation and discuss several possible selective pressures toward it. Finally, we discuss the implications of these trends, their limitations, and counterexamples to our analysis. https://arxiv.org/html/2405.07987v5

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