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Synthesizing Robust Adversarial Examples

Anish Athalye, Logan Engstrom, Andrew Ilyas, Kevin Kwok

2017 · arXiv

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From the abstract

Standard methods for generating adversarial examples for neural networks do not consistently fool neural network classifiers in the physical world due to a combination of viewpoint shifts, camera noise, and other natural transformations, limiting their relevance to real-world systems. We demonstrate the existence of robust 3D adversarial objects, and we present the first algorithm for synthesizing examples that are adversarial over a chosen distribution of transformations. We synthesize two-dimensional adversarial images that are robust to noise, distortion, and affine transformation. We apply our algorithm to complex three-dimensional objects, using 3D-printing to manufacture the first physical adversarial objects. Our results demonstrate the existence of 3D adversarial objects in the physical world.

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7 selected excerpts · 7 total mentions

ben_w
Neutral mention · rule
> But powerful humans are also gamed, and usually more easily than computers. It's the "more easily" that I'd dispute. A computer can be examined in detail, its weaknesses probed ruthlessly and systematically until a vulnerability is found. Any one human will have traits in common with others, and differences from those others. For example, your own question: > Haven't you ever told an exec what they wanted to hear, or refrained from telling a manager something that might make you or your project look bad? this would be a dangerous similarity, one that can be manipulated — but not universally, not all of us, and not all the time: there's people who react very negatively…
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to such sycophancy or boasting. > The whole lobbying apparatus is about altering the perceptions of lawmakers so that you get more favorable laws. People usually operate on fewer pieces of data than computers, and so one falsehood can alter their decision-making more than it would a computers. Yup, absolutely. But if the software developer misses something that an outsider can learn about — this can be something that just didn't even exist at the time the developer made their choices, or just a bug they didn't spot — it can be abused in the same way. When it comes to accidents, the USA almost started WW3 because someone forgot to account for the fact that the moon rises in the same part of the sky that a Soviet strike group would come from, and also doesn't respond to IFF pings. The Soviet union made their own mistake with sun glare. When it comes to things outsiders learn and the original developer didn't think of, other than all bugs and exploits, consider also things like this: https://arxiv.org/pdf/1707.07397
dijksterhuis
Neutral mention · rule
Applying some form of transformation is a weak countermeasure to adversarial examples. Especially simple ones such as low pass filters. https://arxiv.org/pdf/1707.07397.pdf Neural Networks do not learn what humans learn. They can learn completely different and sometimes much smaller features.
fxtentacle
Neutral mention · rule
The problem that I see with supervised training of a linear classifier after unsupervised training is that if the unsupervised network is large enough, it allows the supervised trainer to choose the working components. As shown in [1] that can lead to randomly initialized networks working well, too, meaning that this does not necessarily show that the unsupervised training produced useful features. I would instead suggest to train a categorization classifier unsupervised, too, for example using mutual information loss with the correct number of categories, as suggested in [2]. Afterwards, one can then deduct the mapping between the categories learnt unsupervised and the…
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groundtruth categories to allow evaluation. That way, good results clearly prove a good unsupervised training method. The problem that I mean in the second part was that most networks trained for object recognition work on low-level features such as colors and textures, as shown in [3]. The turtle clearly has a turtle shape and arrangement and looks overwhelmingly like a turtle to humans. But its high-frequency surface details are those that the neural network associates with a rifle, which is why those networks are fooled even on photos from varying perspectives. Training a network with a loss to ensure that the local area of an image produces features that are highly correlated to the global features of the same image does not avoid this problem, because the high-frequency patters that the AI erroneously uses for detection are present both in the local as well as in the global scale. Sadly, I don't have any idea on how to improve that either. [1] What's Hidden in a Randomly Weighted Neural Network? https://arxiv.org/abs/1911.13299 [2] Invariant Information Clustering for Unsupervised Image Classification and Segmentation https://arxiv.org/abs/1807.06653 [3] Synthesizing Robust Adversarial Examples https://arxiv.org/abs/1707.07397
bnegreve
Neutral mention · rule
I'm not sure why hackers prefer to hack large scale computer systems rather than individual humans, but they do. So we have to protect neural networks against adversarial examples for the same reason we have to protect databases against sql injections. > so what's the critical difference here? If neural networks are deployed at scale in self driving cars, a single bug could trigger millions of accidents. Printing an adversarial example on billboards would lead to crashes all around the country. Are we going to assume no one is going to try? (btw: real world adversarial examples are easy to craft [1]). [1] https://arxiv.org/pdf/1707.07397.pdf
sgillen
Neutral mention · rule
I think they are using the wrong word here, I think by "determinism" they mean interpretable. You train your big neural network to classify images, it works fine on the test set but then one day in the wild you discover your network classified a turtle as a rifle [0]. Why did it do that? what can we change to fix that, how could we have seen this coming? Those answers won't come easily compared to a more old school system. [0] https://arxiv.org/abs/1707.07397
nealeratzlaff
Neutral mention · rule
I think for most people that hurdle of understanding is immense, and isn't likely to get any better. ML/DL infrastructure will continue to improve and deploying AI systems will become more accessible as time goes on. But I don't see familiarity with (non) convex optimization, statistical learning, topology, etc. becoming mainstream. Without these its hard to see a reasonable path forward for AI. For me this year in DL was a lot narrower. it mostly revolved around systems becoming more human in capability. I think most of this is in the article already: We can now hopefully say that ImageNet has been solved. AlphaZero tackled structured games with a single algorithm…
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[1]. Tacotron2 produced completely passible TTS [2] GANs improved dramatically and saw some good theory to back it up [3] [4]. We also started to care more about how well our models do in general, which to me shows maturity: Adversarial examples showed their teeth, and hopefully convinced everyone to care about robust models [5] [6]. Reinforcement learning algorithms were shown to have poor transferability [7]. In 2018 I hope to see a new kind of CNN. Residual style networks are the norm now, since they mostly solve problems with gradient flow. But take away all the skip connections and we're mostly left with a vgg-style linear net with box filters. I'd be really excited to see a network with image-sized conv filters that could adapt their shape (and therefore representational power) to a given feature or signal. Hopefully 2018 is the year where people stop calling AI a one-trick-pony. I don't hear it as often these days, but I think its time to put that phrase to rest. [1] https://arxiv.org/abs/1712.01815 [2] https://research.googleblog.com/2017/12/tacotron-2-generatin... [3] https://arxiv.org/abs/1710.10196 [4] https://arxiv.org/abs/1701.04862 [5] https://arxiv.org/abs/1707.07397 [6] https://arxiv.org/abs/1710.06081 [7] https://arxiv.org/abs/1709.06560
RodgerTheGreat
Neutral mention · rule
I think the author's conclusion- that this scenario is unrealistic and would never happen given today's understanding of machine learning techniques- is extremely optimistic. NNs are demonstrably[1] not robust image classifiers. In my opinion, it's far more dangerous to downplay the limitations of this technology and embolden snake-oil purveyors than it is to demand an inconvenient degree of rigor and caution in reporting results. [1] https://arxiv.org/abs/1707.07397#

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