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Alignment faking in large language models

Ryan Greenblatt, Carson Denison, Benjamin Wright

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Fabien Roger, Monte MacDiarmid, Sam Marks, Johannes Treutlein, Tim Belonax, Jack Chen, David Duvenaud, Akbir Khan, Julian Michael, Sören Mindermann, Ethan Perez, Linda Petrini, Jonathan Uesato, Jared Kaplan, Buck Shlegeris, Samuel R. Bowman, Evan Hubinger

2024 · arXiv

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From the abstract

We present a demonstration of a large language model engaging in alignment faking: selectively complying with its training objective in training to prevent modification of its behavior out of training. First, we give Claude 3 Opus a system prompt stating it is being trained to answer all queries, even harmful ones, which conflicts with its prior training to refuse such queries. To allow the model to infer when it is in training, we say it will be trained only on conversations with free users, not paid users. We find the model complies with harmful queries from free users 14% of the time, versus almost never for paid users. Explaining this gap, in almost all cases where the model complies with a harmful query from a free user, we observe explicit alignment-faking reasoning, with the model stating it is strategically answering harmful queries in training to preserve its preferred harmlessness behavior out of training. Next, we study a more realistic setting where information about the training process is provided not in a system prompt, but by training on synthetic documents that mimic pre-training data--and observe similar alignment faking. Finally, we study the effect of actually training the model to comply with harmful queries via reinforcement learning, which we find increases the rate of alignment-faking reasoning to 78%, though also increases compliance even out of training. We additionally observe other behaviors such as the model exfiltrating its weights when given an easy opportunity. While we made alignment faking easier by telling the model when and by what criteria it was being trained, we did not instruct the model to fake alignment or give it any explicit goal. As future models might infer information about their training process without being told, our results suggest a risk of alignment faking in future models, whether due to a benign preference--as in this case--or not.

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4 selected excerpts · 4 total mentions

vonneumannstan
Strong recommendation · rule
It's really very simple. As models become more capable they may become interested in deceiving humans or otherwise manipulating them to achieve their goals. We already see this in various places see: https://www.anthropic.com/research/agentic-misalignment https://arxiv.org/abs/2412.14093 If the chain of thought of models becomes pure "neuralese" i.e. the models think purely in latent space then we will lose the ability to monitor for malicious behavior. This is incredibly dangerous, CoT monitoring is one of the best and highest leverage tools for monitoring model behavior and losing that would be devastating for safety. https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/D2Aa25eaEhdBNeEEy/worries-ab... https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/mpmsK8KKysgSKDm2T/the-most-f... https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/3W8HZe8mcyoo4qGkB/an-idea-fo... https://x.com/RyanPGreenblatt/status/1908298069340545296 https://redwoodresearch.substack.com/p/notes-on-countermeasu...
themanmaran
Neutral mention · rule
Anthropic regularly publishes research papers on the subject and details different methods they use to prevent misalignment/jailbreaks/etc. And it's not even about fear of being sued, but needing to deliver some level of resilience and stability for real enterprise use cases. I think there's a pretty clear profit incentive for safer models. https://arxiv.org/abs/2501.18837 https://arxiv.org/abs/2412.14093 https://transformer-circuits.pub/2025/introspection/index.ht...
edouard-harris
Neutral mention · rule
> In R1 they saw it was mixing languages and fixed it with cold start data. They did (partly) fix R1's tendency to mix languages, thereby making its CoT more interpretable. But that fix came at the cost of degrading the quality of the final answer.[0] Since we can't reliably do interpretability on latents anyway, presumably the only metric that matters in that case is answer quality - and so observing thinking tokens gets you no marginal capability benefit. (It does however give you a potential safety benefit - as Anthropic vividly illustrated in their "alignment faking" paper. [1]) The bitter lesson strikes yet again: if you ask for X to get to Y, your results are worse…
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than if you'd just asked for Y directly in the first place. [0] From the R1 paper: "To mitigate the issue of language mixing, we introduce a language consistency reward during RL training, which is calculated as the proportion of target language words in the CoT. Although ablation experiments show that such alignment results in a slight degradation in the model’s performance, this reward aligns with human preferences, making it more readable.“ [emphasis added] [1] https://arxiv.org/pdf/2412.14093
byschii
Neutral mention · rule
isn't this dangerous? isn't the efficiency given at the expense of safety and interpretability? https://arxiv.org/abs/2412.14093 (Alignment faking in large language models) https://joecarlsmith.com/2024/12/18/takes-on-alignment-fakin... PS I m definitely not an expert

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