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On the Measure of Intelligence

François Chollet

2019 · arXiv

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From the abstract

To make deliberate progress towards more intelligent and more human-like artificial systems, we need to be following an appropriate feedback signal: we need to be able to define and evaluate intelligence in a way that enables comparisons between two systems, as well as comparisons with humans. Over the past hundred years, there has been an abundance of attempts to define and measure intelligence, across both the fields of psychology and AI. We summarize and critically assess these definitions and evaluation approaches, while making apparent the two historical conceptions of intelligence that have implicitly guided them. We note that in practice, the contemporary AI community still gravitates towards benchmarking intelligence by comparing the skill exhibited by AIs and humans at specific tasks such as board games and video games. We argue that solely measuring skill at any given task falls short of measuring intelligence, because skill is heavily modulated by prior knowledge and experience: unlimited priors or unlimited training data allow experimenters to "buy" arbitrary levels of skills for a system, in a way that masks the system's own generalization power. We then articulate a new formal definition of intelligence based on Algorithmic Information Theory, describing intelligence as skill-acquisition efficiency and highlighting the concepts of scope, generalization difficulty, priors, and experience. Using this definition, we propose a set of guidelines for what a general AI benchmark should look like. Finally, we present a benchmark closely following these guidelines, the Abstraction and Reasoning Corpus (ARC), built upon an explicit set of priors designed to be as close as possible to innate human priors. We argue that ARC can be used to measure a human-like form of general fluid intelligence and that it enables fair general intelligence comparisons between AI systems and humans.

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20 selected excerpts · 31 total mentions

visarga
Recommendation · rule
> makes the best possible decision about the future with the information that it has available So would a good thermostat be considered intelligent, assuming it takes great decisions? Intelligence needs to be defined with respect to a range of tasks and a range of priors. It's skill acquisition efficiency, not just taking good decisions. I recommend "On the Measure of Intelligence" by François Chollet >We argue that solely measuring skill at any given task falls short of measuring intelligence, because skill is heavily modulated by prior knowledge and experience: unlimited priors or unlimited training data allow experimenters to "buy" arbitrary levels of skills for a…
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system, in a way that masks the system's own generalization power. We then articulate a new formal definition of intelligence based on Algorithmic Information Theory, describing intelligence as skill acquisition efficiency and highlighting the concepts of scope, generalization difficulty, priors, and experience. https://arxiv.org/abs/1911.01547
LarsDu88
Neutral mention · rule
You're take basically lines up with Francois Chollet: https://arxiv.org/abs/1911.01547 intelligence is more like polishing a ball smooth than growing the ball to infinity. For many tasks, it will be smooth enough.
daveguy
Neutral mention · rule
It may have been tested on the full set, but the score you quote is for a single game environment. Not the full public set. That fact is verbatim in what you responded to and vbarrielle quoted. It scored 97% in one game, and 0% in another game. The full prelude to what vbarrielle quoted, the last sentence of which you left out, was: > We then tested the harnesses on the full public set (which researchers did not have access to at the time). We found extreme bimodal performance across the two sets, controlling for the same frontier model... The harness only transfers to like-environments and the intelligence for those specific games is baked into the harness by the humans…
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who coded it for this specific challenge. The point of ARC-AGI is to test the intelligence of AI systems in novel, but simple, environments. Having a human give it more powerful tools in a harness defeats the purpose. You should go back and read the original ARC-AGI paper to see what this is about+. Are you upset about the benchmark because frontier LLM models do so poorly exhibiting the ability to generalize when the benchmarks are released? + https://arxiv.org/abs/1911.01547
nxobject
Neutral mention · rule
I understand Chollet is transparent that the "branding" of the ARC-AGI-n suites is meant to be suggestive of its purpose, than substantial. However, it does rub me the wrong way - as someone who's cynical of how branding can enable breathless AI hype by bad journalism. A hypothetical comparison would be labelling SHRDLU's (1968) performance on Block World planning tasks as "ARC-AGI-(-1)".[0] A less loaded name like (bad strawman option) "ARC-VeryToughSymbolicReasoning" should capture how the ARC-AGI-n suite is genuinely and intrinsically very hard for current AIs, and what progress satisfactory performance on the benchmark suite would represent. Which Chollet has done, and has grounded him throughout! [1] [0] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SHRDLU [1] https://arxiv.org/abs/1911.01547
whiplash451
Neutral mention · rule
You're not the only one. ARC-AGI is a laudable effort, but its fundamental premise is indeed debatable: "We argue that human cognition follows strictly the same pattern as human physical capabilities: both emerged as evolutionary solutions to specific problems in specific evironments" (from page 22 of On the Measure of Intelligence) https://arxiv.org/pdf/1911.01547
mrandish
Neutral mention · rule
Assessing AI's progress toward replicating the full breadth and depth of human intelligence is a deceptively hard problem. A paper by François Chollet, who was until recently a researcher at Google, called "On the Measure of Intelligence" is the best overview of the challenges I've read. Highly recommended. https://arxiv.org/abs/1911.01547
not-a-cat
Neutral mention · rule
Unnamed AI research lab | ML research engineer | Zurich, Switzerland | Full-time | Onsite | 100-200k CHF I am starting a research lab funded by a hedge fund that I created 5 years ago. The hedge is doing well, and applies ML to quant finance. The research and trading activities should reinforce each other over time: the research publishes research and fosters in-house ML expertise. The trading applies ML to quant finance and brings funding. The research entity is incorporated, funded, has an office and 0 employees currently. My vision for the research lab is the following: - A bunch of phds in a room: create a good working environment, optimize for research output &…
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runway. - Take the "bitter lesson" seriously: most of the successes in modern machine learning are due to deep learning and the ability to leverage vasts amounts of compute and data. I want to study how DL/LLM models reason, using ARC as a benchmark (https://arcprize.org/, https://arxiv.org/abs/1911.01547). Techniques I want to investigate include test time compute, active inference, meta-learning, self-play, or any technique that would be considered "system 2". With that in mind, today I'm looking for the following role: - ML research engineer Compensation will include flexible options scheme based on results. Interest and knowhow in the following is a plus: Deep learning, transformer models, reasoning, world models, learning-to-learn, mechinterp, bayesian methods, probabilistic programming. I will mostly consider candidates having an EU passport for visa reasons. To apply, email me at not_a_cat at fastmail dot com.
YeGoblynQueenne
Neutral mention · rule
What they mean by "specific learned skill" is that each task illustrates the use of certain "core knowledge priors" that François Chollet has claimed are necessary to solve said tasks. You can find this claim in Chollet's white paper that introduced ARC, linked below: On the Measure of Intelligence https://arxiv.org/abs/1911.01547 "Core knowledge priors" are a concept from psychology and cognitive science as far as I can tell. To be clear, other than Chollet's claim that the "core knowledge priors" are necessary to solve ARC tasks, as far as I can tell, there is no other reason to assume so and every single system that has posted any above-0% results so far does not make…
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any attempt to use that concept, so at the very least we can know that the tasks solved so far do not need any core knowledge priors to be solved. But, just to be perfectly clear: when results are posted, they are measured by simple comparison of the target output grids with the output grids generated by a system. Not by comparing the method used to solve a task. Also, if I may be critical: you can find this information all over the place online. It takes a bit of reading I suppose, but it's public information.
levocardia
Neutral mention · rule
A little surprised that neither the paper nor the discussion here cite Francois Chollet's 2019 paper on defining intelligence for machines [1], which talks explicitly about visual reasoning and proposed an RPM-like visual task as a benchmark. I found it very useful for thinking about what it means for an AI to be generally intelligent. From what I remember (having not read it in a while), his idea is basically that general intelligence is the efficiency with which you can learn, after appropriately "penalizing" any baked-in priors or knowledge beyond what a typical animal is born with. As an example, Magnus Carlsen's chess skill is a testament to his general intelligence…
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because he became skilled at chess in one human lifetime, starting out with only basic priors about the world like objectness, agentness, and some others I can't remember. In contrast, DeepBlue is not as intelligent, because it started with many more priors specific to chess, and AlphaZero is also not as intelligent, because it acquired its chess skill much less efficiently, requiring the equivalent of thousands of human lifetimes. I don't remember if the paper considers whether 3.5 billion years of "pre-training" counts in this regard, though. [1] https://arxiv.org/abs/1911.01547
TacticalCoder
Neutral mention · rule
> IQ tests for models seem...somewhat flawed. They are for all the reasons you explain. Here's a wonderful paper (which I probably found here on HN) on the subject: On the Measure of Intelligence, by Francois Chollet (working for Google), from 2019: https://arxiv.org/abs/1911.01547 He comes up with many tests which are relatively simple for humans that AI models cannot solve. If you don't want to read all the paper, jump to the figures (starting from page 48). The goal, of course, is not to train an AI on the correct results of the exact problems in that paper: that'd just be more memory testing. Once Claude solves that, things are going to get really wild!
sinenomine
Neutral mention · rule
To add to it: a recent attempt at designing a psychometric test encoding human cognitive priors: https://arxiv.org/abs/1911.01547 - the ARC dataset. https://github.com/google/BIG-bench - the most recent kitchen sink of a cognitive test, which includes the previous test as a subtask. Apparently there are large language models (Chinchilla) that perform comparably to a median human level on this second test.
nl
Neutral mention · rule
> I don't think we are near general AI Nor do I. But I don't agree with your definition of general AI at all. I think by your definition we are well on the way towards it. I'd note that you didn't address the idea that compression of input concepts into a lower dimensional space is exactly the "reliably turning symbols into meaning" idea you suggest. The fact the latent representations of concepts can be manipulated in ways that make logical sense is a good indication that the symbols have meaning. The classic Word2Vec experiments showing how the relationships Paris->France ~= London->England and King - Man + Woman = Queen show this well. Modern large language models are…
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much more complicated of course, but the principles remain. > I subscribe to the view we think of the human mind as a pattern matching computer simply because this is the current major tech, much like people in the past thought of "humors" or "steam machines". I think some of the analogies are useful, to a point, but I don't think there's hard evidence the mind is like a neural net (irony notwithstanding) or a pattern marching GPT-like algorithm. I don't think the computational approach is an interesting question. No one thinks brains operate like software neural networks (not sure what "pattern marching GPT-like algorithm" means - it is just a neural network). That doesn't matter because all computational methods are ultimately equivalent. I think outcomes on metrics like benchmarks is important, and while some benchmarks have issues that some approaches exploit I think things like Chollet's "On the Measure of Intelligence" (https://arxiv.org/abs/1911.01547) are reasonable frameworks for discussion of progress. > Re: Thinking Fast and Slow, I see there are serious doubts about the validity of the book's foundations and conclusions, and that it's been challenged. This in inaccurate. There are some reasonable criticisms of the studies on the priming affect (one chapter of the book). These and Kahneman's response (he accepts the criticisms) are outlined in https://replicationindex.com/category/thinking-fast-and-slow... and https://retractionwatch.com/2017/02/20/placed-much-faith-und... These issues don't detract from the overall theme of the book about the two systems of decision making (rational and reflex) and how often we use the reflex decision system but convince ourselves we are using the rational system. If you can point at any additional doubts about the books conclusions I'd appreciate a reference.
yamrzou
Neutral mention · rule
Very Interesting. This reminds me of The Abstraction and Reasoning Corpus [1] by François Chollet, accompanying his paper On the Measure of Intelligence [2]... Edit: Found a recent article mentioning both and discussing a NeurIPS paper on using Bongard problems to test AI systems [3]. [1] https://github.com/fchollet/ARC [2] https://arxiv.org/abs/1911.01547 [3] https://spectrum.ieee.org/tech-talk/artificial-intelligence/...
m3at
Neutral mention · rule
On the Measure of Intelligence, François Chollet [1] Fellow HNer seems to have liked a lot of ML paper, this is not breaking the trend. This is a great meta paper questioning the goal of the field itself, and proposing ways to formally evaluate intelligence in a computational sense. Chollet is even ambitious enough to propose a proof of concept benchmark! [2] I also like some out of the box methods people tried to get closer to a solution, like this one combining cellular automata and ML [3] [1] https://arxiv.org/abs/1911.01547 [2] https://github.com/fchollet/ARC [3] https://www.kaggle.com/arsenynerinovsky/cellular-automata-as...
Isinlor
Neutral mention · rule
If someone wants to go as far as to claim that any computation is just curve-fitting then your statement is equivalent to Church–Turing thesis. There are no formal arguments against Church–Turing thesis. From that perspective intelligence is indeed just a curve fitting. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Church%E2%80%93Turing_thesis I really enjoyed the "The Measure of Intelligence" by François Chollet. https://arxiv.org/abs/1911.01547 "We note that in practice, the contemporary AI community still gravitates towards benchmarking intelligence by comparing the skill exhibited by AIs and humans at specific tasks such as board games and video games. We argue that solely measuring…
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skill at any given task falls short of measuring intelligence, because skill is heavily modulated by prior knowledge and experience: unlimited priors or unlimited training data allow experimenters to "buy" arbitrary levels of skills for a system, in a way that masks the system's own generalization power." He argues that we should move towards evaluating "Intelligence as skill-acquisition efficiency". I agree with him. We should move away from benchmarks that involve training and evaluating algorithms on the same datasets. This is indeed more or less "curve fitting". Instead we should focus on benchmarking how efficient algorithms are at solving tasks involving completely new datasets, preferably even unknown to the developers. For example, language model GPT-2 was trained to predict next word given some previous words. After that training GPT-2 was able to do things that were unrelated like question answering, translating etc. GPT-2 is of course doing that very badly, and requires GB of training data, but it is a step towards skill-acquisition efficiency and away from what everyone sees as curve-fitting. We should benchmark models so that we select for these that are able to do solve tasks they were not build to solve.
glial
Neutral mention · rule
I'm not sure this is necessarily true. At a smaller scale, we didn't need to understand how humans play chess in order to build a good chess AI. I do think we need a better understanding of what we mean when we talk about intelligence, if we expect to recreate it. Francois Chollet has a good recent paper about this [1]. [1] https://arxiv.org/abs/1911.01547

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