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An Analysis of Anonymity in the Bitcoin System

Fergal Reid, Martin Harrigan

2011 · arXiv

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From the abstract

Anonymity in Bitcoin, a peer-to-peer electronic currency system, is a complicated issue. Within the system, users are identified by public-keys only. An attacker wishing to de-anonymize its users will attempt to construct the one-to-many mapping between users and public-keys and associate information external to the system with the users. Bitcoin tries to prevent this attack by storing the mapping of a user to his or her public-keys on that user's node only and by allowing each user to generate as many public-keys as required. In this chapter we consider the topological structure of two networks derived from Bitcoin's public transaction history. We show that the two networks have a non-trivial topological structure, provide complementary views of the Bitcoin system and have implications for anonymity. We combine these structures with external information and techniques such as context discovery and flow analysis to investigate an alleged theft of Bitcoins, which, at the time of the theft, had a market value of approximately half a million U.S. dollars.

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7 selected excerpts · 7 total mentions

DennisP
Neutral mention · rule
That is not correct. Paper: http://arxiv.org/abs/1107.4524 IP address is one of many ways that particular bitcoin addresses can be linked to real identities. The rest is graph analysis.
davidjohnstone
Neutral mention · rule
There are a lot of dead Bitcoins around. This thread [1] documents about 70,000 lost Bitcoins, and you can be sure there's a lot more. The other way to lose Bitcoins, apart from losing a wallet or forgetting its password, is to make a transaction to a bad address (as in, a valid-according-to-the-protocol address that isn't anybodies). If I understand how it works correctly, you wouldn't fake ownership of a wallet per se; you would need to come up with private keys to match the public keys of the transactions that belong to that wallet, which I believe is equivalent to breaking SHA256. That would be unexpected. Also, there's no way to tell if a wallet is dead or just not…
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in use (that is, all you can know is that there are transactions that have not been spent yet, and if the same address is used to receive multiple transactions you have additional information that indicates the wallet is not in use… but it can never indicate that it's dead). If you managed to claim ownership of a dead wallet, there's nothing at all stopping you from claiming ownership of an in-use wallet too. But SHA256 is looking pretty secure right now. As for the way Bitcoins will inevitably be lost over time, it's generally considered in the Bitcoin community [2][3] that there's nothing to worry about (it will just add a bit more deflationary pressure). I don't like this aspect of the currency — money disappearing into the void with no hope to correct for mistakes might make it perfect for computers, but it's not so good for humans. As for tracking stolen Bitcoins, if the transaction hashes of the thefts were made public, an exchange should be able to tell if the Bitcoins that somebody is trying to turn into real money were once stolen. This is because the blockchain contains the entire history of Bitcoins — the way Bitcoins are spent is by taking the Bitcoins from a previous transaction and making a new transaction based on them; all this information is stored in the blockchain[4]. Some work has been done[5][6] at looking at what can be discovered by looking at the blockchain — it's not nearly as anonymous as many think it is. 1. https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=7253.0 2. https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/Myths#Lost_coins_can.27t_be_repla... 3. https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=109117.0 4. https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/Transactions 5. http://arxiv.org/pdf/1107.4524.pdf 6. http://eprint.iacr.org/2012/584.pdf
betterunix
Neutral mention · rule
The biggest issue, in my view, is that you cannot have both scalability and secure offline transactions in a system like Bitcoin -- specifically, in any system that lacks currency issuing authorities. Chaum showed this long before there was a Bitcoin (sorry if this is not an article you can easily find for free): https://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=1754992 In layman's terms, the result is this: every time you make a secure digital cash transfer, the amount of information needed in future transfers of the money increases. The increase is, in the best case, linear in the number of offline transactions. Traditionally, that is solved by having a "bank" that issues the initial…
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information, and which will re-issue currency to reset its size. In the case of Bitcoin, there is no such authority, meaning that either you'll hit this scalability problem or you cannot have secure offline payments. In Bitcoin's case, solutions have been given for the scalability problem; it is safe to conclude that offline payments are impossible. Lacking offline transactions is a big deal in practice. It means that we cannot meet anywhere "off the grid" and expect to be able to transfer money. It means that gas pumps need reliable Internet connections. It means that hot dog stands need Internet service. In other words, it means that Bitcoin cannot replace paper money -- whereas Chaumiam-style systems could, or at least have a stronger case for being able to. There is also reason to doubt Bitcoin's security model. See, for example, this work on analyzing the publicly available information in Bitcoin to de-anonymize its users: http://arxiv.org/abs/1107.4524 Really, if I were to be as conservative about security as possible, I would say that the only security Bitcoin provides is protection against double-spending in online transactions; I would not rely on anonymity, and I would not even think about offline payments. Considering how much work was done in the early 90s on digital cash systems that not only protect against double spending, but which also allow secure offline transactions and which ensure the anonymity of users, I don't think it is unfair to say that Bitcoin has technical weaknesses compared to other systems.
feral
Neutral mention · rule
Actually, I think the suggestion in the report is correct. I think that what they are getting at here, is the following scenario: Imagine that you have several addresses, with different balances, in the same wallet. If you do a payment using the normal client, which requires the total balance from all those addresses, this will create a transaction with all those addresses as inputs. In the Bitcoin protocol this provides unambiguous proof that the input addresses are all controlled by the same user. (With some provisos: obviously wallet services overlaid on the network complicate this; as do some other more sophisticated uses of the protocol; but in general, at a protocol…
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level, this is true). So, that then shows any passively listening third party that all those addresses were under control of a single user. This knowledge can then be applied transitively, to consolidate ownership of large quantities of accounts. (We tried explain this in our paper: http://arxiv.org/pdf/1107.4524v2.pdf Fig 1.6) What the report is probably getting at, is that an alternative thing to do, would be to instead send all the payments to a new account, in separate transactions. This would introduce a lot more ambiguity for a passive attacker - passive ownership assumptions become a lot less clearcut. You can still try make deductions, but its going to be much larger to do at large scale, and require more statistical assumptions. Its not completely obvious that this is what the paper is suggesting, but thats my reading of it, and I think that makes sense.
davidjohnstone
Neutral mention · rule
Crypto-currencies might be, but I don't think Bitcoin is an existential threat to the modern liberal state. The anonymity that every mainstream article claims Bitcoin has is not nearly as strong as it's made out to be[1][2][3]. The built-in deflationary aspect of Bitcoin seems to prevent it from being used as a "serious" currency. Hiding money under your mattress should never be the optimal approach to making more money. (It might not prevent people from using the currency, but it's highly sub-optimal.) The fragility of the currency concerns me (by which I mean the way it's possible to lose massive amounts of money by losing a file or forgetting a password). Maybe this is…
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a technical problem that will be solved with a more mature ecosystem, but I like the way that a real bank always has ways to access money when bad things happen (at least in a functioning banking system). This thread[4] documents the loss of about 70,000 Bitcoins, which is worth about ten million dollars today. Related to this, if somebody hacked the EFF's Twitter account and posted that they were accepting Bitcoin donations on some address, a lot of Bitcoins would disappear into somebodies wallet. You could argue that Bitcoin is a more perfect sort of system, but it's not without downsides. Maybe another crypto-currency will come along and solve these problems. I think I hope it does. But I don't see Bitcoin supplanting modern state-backed currencies. I find it hard to see Bitcoin being used more widely than by the idealogues, the speculators, and those who find utility in it (like Silk Road, but not just that). 1. http://arxiv.org/pdf/1107.4524.pdf 2. http://eprint.iacr.org/2012/584.pdf 3. https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/Anonymity 4. https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=7253.0
feral
Neutral mention · rule
I've done some work on this (http://arxiv.org/abs/1107.4524) and the phenomenon that coderr describes is very widespread in practice (we can examine this passively, from the transaction history) and its linking identities we can be pretty sure the users didn't intend to have linked. I'd say that anyone concerned about anonymity should be using a client with the functionality that coderr's patch provides, and be incredibly careful using Bitcoin in general.

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